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LIST OF PARTIES 
This appeal arrises out of a criminal proceeding in 
the Fifth Circuit Court, West Valley Department, before 
the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley. The original parties were 
West Valley City as plaintiff, and Frank Ronald Borrego as 
defendant. Mr. Borrego is appealing a finding of contempt 
by Judge Medley and the Fifth Circuit Court has responded 
to the appeal by Mr. Borrego. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
§77-35-26 (1953), granting jurisdiction to this Court 
to hear and decide appeals from Circuit Courts which 
affect the substantial rights of a defendant. Appellant 
is appealing a finding of contempt by the Fifth Circuit 
Court, West Valley City Department, during sentencing in a 
criminal action. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did appellantfs conduct during the sentencing 
procedure fall within the protection of his constitutional 
right to free speech and right to counsel, which would 
nullify a finding of contempt? 
2. Does the Court have a duty to warn a person that 
his conduct is not acceptable and if continued, will 
result in a finding of contempt? 
3. Is there sufficient evidence in the record that 
appellant in fact interrupted the due course of the 
proceedings of the Court? 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATUTES 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the rxght of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
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government for a redress of grievances." 
U.S. Const. Amend 1. 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committedf which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. Amend VI. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witness in 
his own beahlf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged tohave been 
committed, and the reight to appeal in all cases. 
Const, of Ut. Sec. 12. 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain 
the freedom of speech or of the press....Const, 
of Ut. Sec. 15 * 
The following acts or omissions in respect 
to a court or proceedings therein are contempts 
of the authority of the Court: (1) 
Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior 
towards the judge while holding the court, 
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial 
or other judicial proceeding. Utah Code 
Ann., §78-32-1(1) (1953) . 
...At the time of sentencing, the court 
shall hear any testimony or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires 
to present concerning the appropriate sentence. 
This testimony or information shall be 
presented in open court on record and in the 
presence of the defendant. Utah Code Ann., 
§77-18-1(4) (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant (Mr. Borrego) was found guilty of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, disorderly conduct, 
terroristic threats and public intoxication on June 19, 
1987. Mr. Borrego represented himself at the trial and 
after having been found guilty, requested that the Court 
provide him with an attorney before sentencing. 
Mr. Borrego appeared with court-appointed counsel for 
sentencing on July 16, 1987. During the course of the 
sentencing proceedings, Mr. Borrego had several discussions 
with his attorney on the record, as well as one 
conversation off the record. The Court, after pronouncing 
sentence on the original charges, indicated that he found 
Mr. Borrego to be in contempt of court for having used 
profanity in his courtroom, which tended to interrupt the 
orderly proceedings of the sentencing hearing. Judge 
Medley consequently sentenced Mr. Borrego to serve 30 days 
in the county jail for his contempt. 
Pursuant to the instructions of the Court, Mr. 
Borrego, who was in custody at the time due to a 
commitment he was serving from another Court, was placed 
sitting down in the jury box, still in handcuffs and 
shackles. A microphone was placed directly in front of 
him. (Transcript page 11, hereafter abbreviated as T.) 
Counsel then addressed the Court at the podium in the 
middle of the courtroom. During the sentencing 
proceeding, Mr. Borrego1s court-appointed counsel made a 
motion for a new trial and presented argument thereon. 
The Court, after considering the motion, denied the motion 
and counsel made the statement to the Court that he was 
not aware of any legal reason why sentencing should not 
proceed. At that time, Mr. Borrego, who was seated across 
the room from his attorney, spoke up with the statement, 
"Pardon ir,e.lf (T at 6). The Court then indicated, "Just a 
second, Mr. Borrego." id. After a brief discussion 
between the Court and counsel, the Court stated the 
following: 
The Court: 
Mr. Kunz: 
Mr. Borrego: 
Mr. Kunz: 
Mr. BorregoJ 
I'll allow you to conference 
with Mr. Borrego, since he has 
his hand raised. Go ahead, sir. 
Thank you. 
How about lack of due process? 
Shhh, Okay. 
Goddamit, I was kept in a goddam 
holding cell four-and-a-half hours 
while people went to lunch and came 
back, and he went to lunch and came 
back, and goddamit, I didn't have 
lunch. 
Mr. Kunz: Shhh. 
(Conference off the record between counsel 
and his client) 
Mr. Borrego: Goddamit. I want this goddam 
judge dismissed for prejudice. 
(T at 6 and 7). 
Mr. Borrego1s counsel then made further argument to 
the Court on his motion for a new trial, and there 
occurred further dialogue between counsel and the Court 
pertaining to the arguments raised. (T at 7, 8 and 9). 
The argument asserted by counsel on behalf of Mr. Borrego 
was that Mr. Borrego was denied due process in that he 
was held in a holding cell from approximately 9:00 A.M. 
until his trial began at 1:30 in the afternoon, and Mr. 
Borrego was not allowed to eat lunch or have any sort of 
snack. Counsel argued that other people visiting the 
Court had such freedom and the Court responded as 
follows: 
The Court: Do you know why you probably have 
that freedom, Mr. Kunz? And let me 
state this as well. As you noticed 
within your conversation with Mr. 
Borrego, he used profanity which I 
find extremely offensive— 
Mr. Borrego: I find your court profane. 
The Court: And as you see, he is acting in the 
manner that he's currently acting 
in, is in essence the same way on 
which he was acting on that particular 
day. 
Mr. Borrego: It's not an act. 
The Court: When a defendant acts in that 
particular manner, of course, in 
order to continue with the Court's 
business in an orderly manner, we 
take them out of the Courtroom. Now, 
I am confident that that was one of the 
reasons why Mr. Borrego was held in 
the holding cell versus sitting in 
the jury box, as he is right now. 
(T at 7) . 
Further dialogue continued, wherein Mr. Borrego made 
various statements, with the permission of his counsel 
and with the permission of the Court. The Court even 
indicated at one point that the proceedings, which were 
taking place where Mr. Borrego was being allowed an 
opportunity to speak with the Court on the record, was 
proper unless there was some valid reason for the 
proceedings not to be recorded. (T at 11) After the 
Court pronounced that it was proper for conversation to 
be on the record, Mr. Borrego was allowed to speak 28 
times, without interruption by the Court, and without any 
indication at all from the Court that he was not allowed 
to speak, except for one point where the Court asked Mr. 
Borrego not to interrupt him, and Mr. Borrego obliged the 
Court without any interruption. (T at 13) 
Following the pronouncement of sentence on the four 
charges to which Mr. Borrego had previously been found 
guilty of, the Court stated the following: 
The Court: I personally feel as if I have been 
rather patient with Mr. Borrego. 
Based on his outbursts in which, on 
a number of times here in this 
courtroom this morning, he used profanity, 
I think Mr. Borrego is keenly aware that 
this is improper conduct in this particular 
Court... I am satisfied that his conduct is 
designed to prevent and interfere with 
the orderly process of this particular 
Court. (T at 17). 
The Court subsequently found Mr. Borrego in contempt 
of court and sentenced him to spend 30 days in the Salt 
Lake County Jail, which 30 days was to run consecutive to 
the time that Mr. Borrego was spending on a commitment 
from another Court. The 30 days jail sentence is the 
maximum allowed by statute for contempt. Utah Code Ann., 
§78-32-1(1) (1953) . 
Although the Court stated at one point that he found 
the use of profanity offensive to him, (T at 9) the 
Court at no time discouraged the appellant from 
discussing matters pertaining to his appearance with his 
attorney in open court, nor did the Court provide any 
warning to Mr. Borrego that if any further outbursts or 
use of profanity continued, that he would be found in 
contempt of court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Mr. Borrego had a right to provide testimony or 
information to the Court which concerned an appropriate 
sentence. Even though he had counsel appointed to speak 
for him, he was not precluded from speaking himself and 
in fact the Court gave him permission to speak during the 
proceeding. Even though Mr. Borrego did use profanity in 
the courtroom, the use of profanity was not intended to 
insult or degrade the Court, nor was it intended to 
obstruct the judicial process. 
II. During the sentencing proceeding, Mr. Borrego 
was expressly given permission by the Court to speak. At 
no time did the trial court warn Mr. Borrego that he was 
out of line or that his language was such that it was 
interfering with the orderly process cf the proceeding. 
The Court should give a warning to an individual that his 
conduct is contumacious, unless the conduct is so far out 
of line that the resort to criminal contempt is the only 
way to restore order to the courtroom. 
III. Contemptuous acts under state law or those acts 
which tend to interrupt the due course of a trial or 
other judicial prodeeding. No evidence is found in the 
record that Mr. Borrego1s conduct was in disobedience to 
the Court or in any way interrupted the judicial 
proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. BORREGO1S COMMENTS TO THE COURT DURING 
HIS SENTENCING HEARING ARE PROTECTED BY HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH AND 
TO APPEAL AND DEFEND IN PERSON AND BY 
COUNSEL. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(4) (1953), provides that a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding shall be allowed to 
provide any testimony or information to the court which 
concerns an appropriate sentence. The Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantees the person 
accused of a crime, assistance of legal counsel at all 
critical stages of the proceeding. United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 192 (1967). 
The Constitutional right to assistance of legal counsel 
does not preclude a defendant from speaking to sentence 
himself, nor does it prohibit him from communicating with 
legal counsel during the proceeding. Const, of Ut. Sec. 
12. Mr. Borrego did not have benefit of legal counsel 
during his trial, and his court-appointed lawyer did not 
have the benefit of reading a transcript of the actual 
trial proceeding. (T at 2). It was therefore necessary 
that Mr. Borrego be allowed to speak during the 
sentencing process and make comments to his attorney. 
Since Mr. Borrego was not allowed to stand next to his 
attorney at the podium while addressing the Court, it 
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became necessary that Mr. Borrego speak to his attorney 
from across the room* Counsel for Mr. Borrego questioned 
whether or not it was proper procedure for Mr. Borrego 
to speak loudly in the courtroom as he was addressing 
his attorney, and the Court indicated to counsel that it 
was proper and that all of Mr. Borrego1s comments would 
be made part of the record, since a microphone had been 
placed in front of him, unless there was a valid reason 
to the contrary. (T at 10 and 11). 
Mr. Borrego1s rights to freedom of speech 
guaranteed him by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Section 15 of the Constitution of 
Utah, are susceptable to restriction only to prevent 
grave and immediate danger to interests which a state may 
lawfuly protect. West Virginia State Beard of Education 
v. Varneute, 319 U.S. 624, 87 L.Ed. 1628, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 
147 ALR 674 (1943). The Utah State Legislature, in order 
to preserve the dignity and order in our state 
courtrooms, gave the power to our judges to punish 
"disorderly, contemptuous or insolent" behavior toward 
the judge while holding the Court, tending to interrupt 
the due course of trial or the judicial proceding. Utah 
Code Ann., §78-32-1(1) (1953). Thus, courts are obligated 
to balance the defendant's rights to express himself freely 
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in a criminal proceeding, and yet still maintain order 
and dignity in the courtroom. The United States Court 
of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, has established four elements 
which are required in order to support a contempt 
conviction. 
(1) The conduct at issue must constitute 
misbehavior, (2) the misbehavior must rise to 
level of an obstruction of the administration of 
justice, (3) conduct must be in courts presence or 
so proximate that it obstructs the administration 
of justice, and (4) there must be some sort of 
intent to obstruct. United States v. Seale, 461 
F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972). 
Mr. Borrego's comments to the Court and to his 
attorney during the sentencing proceeding were made with 
the encouragement of the court and counsel, and were 
certainly not inteided to disrupt the orderly procedure 
of the court. The mere use of profanity in the courtroom 
should not constitute contempt of court, unless such 
profanity is used to insult or degrade the court, or is 
used with the intent to obstruct the judicial process. 
Gordon v. United States, 592 F.2d 1215 (1st Cir. 1979). 
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that 
Mr. Borrego intended to either insult the Court or to 
obstruct the judicial process in his use of profanity, 
and therefore his comments do not justify a finding 
of contempt. 
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ARGUMENT 
II. A JUDGE IS REQUIRED TO FOREWARN A PERSON 
THAT HIS CONDUCT IS CONTUMACIOUS BEFORE 
A FINDING OF CONTEMPT IS MADE. 
A judge's power to punish contempt committed in his 
presence should be exercised with patience and 
self-restraint, and "judges must be cautious to avoid 
over-reacting when persons not familiar with court 
procedures, through ignorance or frustration, 
unintentially cause minor commotions." Thrap v. People, 
558 P.2d 576 (Colo., 1977). Judge Medley, during the 
sentencing process indicated that Mr. Borrego had 
appeared before him several times and that he assumed 
that Mr. Borrego was familiar with the rules and conduct 
which wa£ expected of him in the courtroom, and that 
during previous confrontations, the solution was to have 
defendants removed from the courtroom until such time as 
their case is called before the Court. (T at 9). Thus, 
it is obvious from the record that Judge Medley was not 
in the habit of citing individuals for contempt and, in 
fact, had established a pattern for dealing with unruly 
behavior in his courtroom. In the case of In the Matter 
of David Dellinger, et al. 370 F.Supp. 1304 (N.D. 111. 
1973), a Federal District Court ruled that a 
defendant can not be cited for contempt for borderline 
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conduct, unless he had been first warned that such 
conduct will be regarded as contumacious, and that 
differences in language patterns between different 
social, ethnic and political groups are relevant to the 
issue.of intent in contempt prosecution. The duty to 
warn a defendant before contempt is found has also been 
upheld by the Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. 
Ellis, 540 P.2d 1082 (Colo., 1975) and by Hr. Justice 
Powell in a concurring opinion in the case of Eaton v. 
City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 
(1974) , when he said: 
I place a high premium on the importance of 
maintaining civility and good order in the 
courtroom. But before there is resort to the 
summary remedy of criminal contempt, the court 
at least owes the party concerned some sort of 
notice or writing. 
The record is void of any warning by the Court to 
Mr. Borrego that if he continued with his conduct, he 
would be found in contempt of court. The Court did 
indicate that he found the use of profanity in his 
courtroom offensive, but the statement that he found 
profanity extremely offensive was made to Mr. Borrego1s 
attorney and not to Mr. Borrego directly, and no 
direction was given to counsel to warn Mr. Borrego. In 
his explanation that he found profanity offensive, Judge 
Medley continued to explain to counsel that Mr. Borrego 
-13-
had acted in a similar manner on the day of trial and 
that the remedy with such a defendant acting in that way 
was to simply take him out of the courtroom until his 
case was called. (T at 9). The record also reflects that 
at one point, the Court, while making a statement to 
counsel, asked Mr. Borrego not to interrupt him, and 
there was no subsequent interruption by Mr. Borrego. 
(T at 13). 
The finding of contempt was not warranted because no 
warning was given and the trial judge acted 
precipitously in finding Mr. Borrego in contempt, only 
after he had pronounced sentence for the charges for 
which Mr. Borrego was convicted at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
III. TEE RECORD OP PROCEEDINGS IS VOID OP 
ANY INTERRUPTION TO THE DDE COURSE OP THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT. 
On^ r of the elements of contempt by statute is that 
there be an interruption of the due course of a trial or 
other judicial proceeding. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-32-1(1) (1953). Mr. Borrego was appearing before 
Judge Medley on the 16th day of July, 1987, to be 
sentenced on crimes which he was found guilty of at 
trial. The comments made by Mr. Borrego on the record 
were made with the purpose of providing information 
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to the Court which pertained to sentencing and motions 
for new trial and for recusal of the Court, which were 
being argued to the Court by counsel. Although Judge 
Medley, in his written findings, stated that the use of 
profanity tended to disrupt the proceedings of the Court, 
there is no specific reference to how the sentencing 
proceeding was delayed or duly interrupted by Mr. 
Borrego1s comments. In the case of Eaton v. City of 
Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 
(1974) , the use of a street variety expletive, in answer 
to a question on cross-examination was declared to 
be insufficient to support a finding of contempt. In 
that case, the Court held: 
In using the expletive in answering the 
question on cross-examination, 'it is not charged 
that [petitioner] here disobeyed any valid court 
order, talked loudly, acted boisterously, or 
attempted to prevent the judge or any other officer 
of the court from carrying on his court duties.' 
Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136, 85 S.Ct. 1375, 
1377, 14 L.Ed.2d 290 (1965); see also In re Little, 
404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659/30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972). 
In the circumstances, the use of the expletive thus 
cannot be used to 'constitute an imminent . . . 
threat to the administration of justice.' 
Before Judge Medley's finding of contempt can be 
upheld on appeal, it must be shown by the record that Mr. 
Borrego's conduct was in disobedience to any valid court 
order, that it was loud, boisterous, or that Mr. Borrego 
attempted to prevent the judge or any other officer of 
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the Court from carrying on his court duties. His 
comments were loud and on the record because the Court 
said it was proper for him to speak to his attorney on 
the record. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a very fine line between the Court's 
interest in an orderly and dignified courtroom, and a 
citizen's First Amendment right to free speech. 
In balancing these two concerns, the Court must exercise 
its power of contempt with patience and self-restraint, 
being cautious to avoid over-reacting to behavior which, 
although may be deemed offensive, does not seriously 
affront or disrupt the judicial process. This is 
especially important in criminal proceedings, where a 
person, such as Mr. Borrego, is already incarcerated and 
appears before the Court in handcuffs and shackles. 
Unless circumstances exist where comments made by a 
defendant are egregious as to justify a summary response 
by the judge without specific warning, a judge should 
issue a warning to the individual before finding 
contempt. The facts in this case certainly are not so 
egregious. 
Appellant seeks to have the finding of contempt 
reversed for reasons that he did not intend to disrupt 
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the sentencing process, and that his use of profanity in 
the courtroom, although offensive to the Court, was not 
disobedient, boisterous, or prevented any officer of the 
court from carrying on his court duties. 
DATED this / % day of November, 19 87. 
Respectfully Submitted. 
RONALD E. KUNZ J 
COOK & WILDE, P.C. 
Attorney's for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / A day of 
November, 1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
instrument was mailed, postage pre-paid to Gregory J. 
Sanders, 175 East 400 South, #300, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
v ^ w i . Uuxi., aTATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPAR224E7T 
W*-ST V?IIZY CITY, 
Plaxnc-ff, : 
vs. : 
FRANK RONALD 30RREGO, 
CCB: 6/9/43 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER OF CONTEMPT 
CASE NO. 871001094MS 
: 871001Q95MS 
FTMDIMGS 
The Defendant m the above entitled rra—ers appeared before m i s Court: for 
sentencing en July 16, 1987. The Defendant was represented by counsel Mr, Ronald Kun 
During the course of sentencing Defendant became loud and boisterous, using 
profanity wmen tended to interrupt tne due course of tne sentencing hearing. The 
Defendant was r^ques"ced by t m s Court: to refrain frcn interrupting tne Court: wnile 
tne sentience was being pronounced, however, Defendant failed ro honor this request 
and responded with loud, boisterous profanity/ dennenstrating ccnteuipmous or 
insolent: benavior toward t m s Court. The aoove described bena ior continued 
repeatedly curing tne courre of the sentencing hearing. 
ORDER 
Sase^ uocr +"^ <^  ^ -^ vjyT^ '! ^><r Defendant!' s conduct is ds^ '^ TTP'? Tyyi ^~r> be 
conreirorucus and tended to interrupt the sentencing hearing, therefore, IT IS 
HERE3Y ORDERED that the Defendant is found m Contempt of this Courr and corrmtted 
to tne Salt Lake County Jail for a period of tmrty (30) days to run 
consecunvelv with all other ccimu/tnenrs cursuanr. to Utah Code Annotated 
78-32-3 as amended. 
DAIED this 16th day of July, 1987 
<j 
TYRCMZ/p- JffiDLEZ 
Fifth yi^cuxt Court Judge 
CERTITIC^TE OF MATING 
I hereby certify that I trailed a true and correct copy of the 
Finding and Crder of Contertpt to Ponald E. Kunz, Attorney for the Defendant, 
6925 Union Park, Suite 449, Midvale, Utah 84047. 
DATED this 16th day of July, 1987. 
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THE JUDGMENT 77-18-1 
CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Proba-
tion — Supervision — Presen-
tence investigation — Confi-
dential — Terms — Restitution 
— Extension or revocation — 
Hearings. 
Section 
77-18-2. 
77-18-5.5. 
77-18-6. 
Expungement and sealing of 
records. 
Judgment of death — Defendant to 
select firing squad or lethal in-
jection. 
Judgment to pay fine or restitution 
constitutes a lien. 
hat fact, the evidence was held to 
to sustain a conviction. State v. 
Jtah 1983) 674 P 2d 117. 
lony of two accomplices was suffi-
ict a defendant as an accomplice in 
•obbery and theft, even though the 
sented alibi testimony. State v. 
i 1985) 706 P 2d 1052. 
tate v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 
v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 
of jurors , etc. 
Juror's reading of newspaper ac-
1 in state criminal case during its 
ground for mistrial, new trial, or 
A.L.R.4th 11. 
on — Oath of officer 
ground for mistrial, new trial, or 
A.L.R.4th 11. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervi-
sion — Presentence investigation — Confidential 
— Terms — Restitution — Extension or revoca-
tion — Hearings. 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or of-
fense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. Supervised probation by the depart-
ment may not be imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemeanors or 
infractions. The jurisdiction of ail probationers referred to the Depart-
ment of Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is 
with the Department of Corrections. 
(b) The legal custody of all probationers not referred to the department 
is vested as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the defer dant. The 
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and pre-
sentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the de-
partment. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the 
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, and other crite-
ria established by the Department of Corrections to determine what level 
of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may super-
vise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department 
standards. 
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concur-
rence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investiga-
tion report from the Department of Corrections or information from other 
sources about the defendant. The presentence investigation report shall in-
clude a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recom-
mendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of 
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restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report are confidential and 
not available except for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council and for use by the Department of Corrections. At the time of 
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or 
the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sen-
tence. This testimony or information shall be presented in open court on 
record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
and 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201 (3) and (4). 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible for the collection of fines 
and restitution during the probation period in cases where the court orders 
supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice 
of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order 
on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The 
order is considered a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil 
remedy. 
(7) (a) Upon completion without violation of IS months' probation in felony 
or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor 
cases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated 
by the court. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court 
and prosecuting attorney in writing 45 days in advance in all cases where 
termination of supervision will occur by law. The notification shall in-
clude a probation progress report and complete report of details on out-
standing fines and restitution orders. 
(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation, upon a minimum 
of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and 
hearing by the probationer, the court may extend probation for an addi-
tional term of 18 months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months 
in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are owing. 
(8) (a) All time served without violation while on probation applies to ser-
vice of the total term of probation but does not eliminate the requirement 
of serving 18 consecutive months without violation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six consecutive months without violation in class 
B misdemeanor cases. Any time served by a probationer outside of con-
finement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior 
to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward 
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing 
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78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt.—The following 
acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are contempts 
of the authority of the court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial 
or other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, 
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty 
by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected 
to perform a judicial or ministerial service. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by 
a party to an action or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the 
court. 
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and 
acting as such without authority. 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by 
virtue of an order or process of such court. 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going 
to, remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on 
the calendar for trial. 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings 
of a court. 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn 
or to answer as a witness. 
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or 
serve is such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be 
tried at such court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of 
such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person 
in respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to the court. 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of 
the lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding 
in an action or special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or 
special proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior 
tribunal, magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or 
process of a judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of such 
officer. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, Cross-References. 
Supp., 104-32-1. Bastardy proceedings, default in pay-
Compiler's Notes. m e n t s ' 77-60-11. 
Except for the substitution of "court" Criminal Code not to affect contempt 
for "court of justice" in the introductory power, 76-1-107, 76-3-201. 
clause, this section is identical to former Discovery, sanctions for noncompliance 
section 104-45-1 (Code 1943) which was with order compelling discovery, Rules of 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3 . Civil Piocedure, Rule 3 7 < » ( D ) \ 
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